Gelfond and Lifschitz introduce a declarative language A for describing e ects of actions and describe translations of theories in this language into extended logic programs. In this paper we extend the language A and its translation to allow reasoning about the e ects of concurrent actions. The logic programming formalization of situation calculus with concurrent actions presented in the paper is of independent interest and may serve as a test bed for the investigation of various transformations and logic programming inference mechanisms. <
INTRODUCTION
Gelfond and Lifschitz GL92] introduce a declarative language A for describing effects of actions and de ne the semantics of this language based on the notion of a nite automaton. The simplicity of the language and its semantics facilitates the description of the ontology of actions and contributes to establishing correctness (and sometimes completeness) of various logical formalizations of their e ects. In particular, a theory of action stated in the language of extended logic programs(ELP's) GL90] was described in GL92] as a translation from a subset of A and proven to be sound w.r.t. the automata based semantics. Kartha Kar93] recently proved soundness and completeness of this semantics with respect to formalizations proposed earlier by Pednault Ped89], Reiter Rei91] and Baker Bak91] .
Although the language A is adequate for formalizing several interesting domains, its expressive power is rather limited. In particular, every action is assumed to be executable in any situation and only one action can be performed at a time. In this paper we expand the syntax and semantics of A to remove these limitations and to allow for a representation of concurrent actions. (For some other recent extensions of A see KL94, BG94b, HT93] .) Our treatment of concurrency in this paper is along the lines suggested in GLR91]. As in GL92], we translate theories in the resulting language A C into logic programs and prove correctness of these translations. The translations can be viewed as a logic programming counterpart of situation calculus MH69] and are interesting in their own right. The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we de ne the syntax and semantics of the language A C . Section 3 describes the translations of theories from A C into logic programs while section 4 illustrates the translations by the way of examples. In section 5 we discuss where and how our paper ts into the state of current research in \reasoning about actions". Proofs of theorems are given in the Appendix.
A LANGUAGE A C
2.1. Syntax First we will recall the syntax of language A from GL92]. where a is an action name, and each of f; p 1 ; : : :; p n (n 0) is a uent literal. The literals p 1 ; : : :; p n are called preconditions of (2) . If n = 0, we write this proposition as a causes f: A domain description in A is a set of v-and e-propositions.
Syntax of A c
The syntax of A C di ers from the syntax of A only in the de nition of action names. By an action name of A C we mean a nonempty nite set fa 1 ; : : :; a n g of elements of 2 . Intuitively, an action name fa i g denotes a unit action while an action name a = fa 1 ; : : :; a n g where n > 1 denotes a compound action { a set of unit actions which are performed concurrently and which start and stop cotemporaneously. For simplicity we will often identify a unit action name fa i g with a i . To illustrate the notion of a domain description in A C let us consider the following examples from GLR91]:
Example 2.1. Mary is lifting a bowl of soup from the kitchen table, while John is opening the door to the dining room.
To represent this story in A C let us consider an alphabet consisting of uent names lifted and opened and two unit actions lift and open. The initial situation is described by v{propositions:
initially :lifted initially :opened
The e ects of the actions can be described by the axioms:
fliftg causes lifted fopeng causes opened
The resulting domain description will be denoted by D 1 . Intuitively, the e ects of the two actions of D 1 are completely independent and so both lifted and opened should hold after the execution of the compound action flift; openg. In a sense, this compound action inherits its e ect from its subactions. 2
The next example describes actions whose e ects are mutually dependent.
Example 2.2. Whenever Mary tries to lift the bowl with one hand, she spills the soup. When she uses both hands, she does not spill the soup. We know that the soup is not spilled initially. This time let us consider an alphabet consisting of a uent name spilled and two unit actions lift l and lift r. The initial situation may be described by a proposition: (b) E ects of an action are either directly speci ed by the e-propositions in the domain description D or inherited from its sub-actions.
Development of the precise semantics of domain descriptions of A C which incorporates these informal assumptions is the subject of the next section.
Semantics
To describe the semantics of A C , we will de ne \models" of a domain description, and when a v-proposition is \true" in a model. If a v-proposition P is true in all models of a domain description D, we say that D entails P. As de ned in GL92], a state is a set of uent names; given a uent name f and a state , we say that f holds in if f 2 ; :f holds in if f 6 2 .
A transition function is a mapping of a subset of the set of pairs (a; ), where a is an action name and is a state, into the set of states. 1 As in GL92], a structure is a pair ( 0 ; ), where 0 is a state (called the initial state of the structure), and is a transition function. We say that a sequence of action names a 1 ; : : :; a m is executable in a structure M = ( 0 ; ) if for every 1 k m (a k ; (a k?1 ; : : :; (a 1 ; 0 ) : : :)) is de ned. The resulting state will be denoted by M (a1;:::;am) . We say that a v-proposition (1) is true (false) in a structure M if 1. a 1 ; : : :; a m is executable in M, 2. f holds (does not hold) in M (a1;:::;am) .
In particular, the proposition \ initially f" is true in M i f holds in the initial state of M. We say that execution of an action a in a state immediately causes a uent literal f if there is an e{proposition \a causes f if p 1 ; : : :; p n " from the domain D such that for every i, 1 i n, p i holds in . We say that execution of an action a in a state causes a uent literal f if 1. a immediately causes f, or 2. a inherits the e ect f from its subsets in , i.e., there is a b a, such that execution of b in immediately causes f and there is no c such that b c a and execution of c in immediately causes :f.
Let a be an action and be a state and consider: E + (a; ) = ff : f is a uent name and execution of a in causes fg, E ? (a; ) = ff : f is a uent name and execution of a in causes :f g. 1 Recall that in the de nition of a transition function in the semantics of A, must be de ned on the set of all such pairs.
A structure ( 0 ; ) will be called a model of a domain description D if the following conditions are satis ed: 1. Every v-proposition from D is true in ( 0 ; ); 2. For every action a = fa 1 ; : : :; a n g and every state (i) if E + (a; ) \ E ? (a; ) = ; then (a; ) is de ned and (a; ) = E + (a; ) n E ? (a; ):
(ii) otherwise (a; ) is unde ned. In general we have the assumption that if an action is not possible then unless otherwise speci ed, a bigger action containing that action is also not possible. This is automatically captured by the fact that compound actions inherit e ects from their subactions. But to say that it is possible to lift a heavy box using both hands we need to have the following in our domain description: 
where k 0, and each l i is a literal, i.e., an atom possibly preceded by :, and not is the negation as failure operator. Expression on the left hand (right hand) side of is called the head (the body) of the rule. Both, the head and the body of (1) can be empty. Unless otherwise stated, we assume that rules with variables are used as shorthand for the set consisting of all their ground instantiations. Intuitively the rule can be read as: if l k+1 ; : : :; l m are believed and it is not true that l m+1 ; : : :; l n are believed then at least one of fl 1 ; : : :; l k g is believed. For a rule r of the form (1) the sets fl 1 ; : : :; l k g, fl k+1 ; : : :; l m g and fl m+1 ; : : :; l n g are referred to as head(r), pos(r) and neg(r) respectively. lit(r) stands for head(r) pos(r) neg(r). These rules are motivated by the \common-sense law of inertia," MH69] according to which truth values of uents are normally not changed by actions. The rules (1a)-(1b) allow us to apply the law of inertia in reasoning \from the past to the future": The rst{when a uent is known to be true in the past, and the second{ when it is known to be false. Intuitively, may imm cause(a; f; s) means that if action a is executed in situation s then f may become true as a direct e ect of the action a. It is used in disabling the inertia rules (1) in the cases when f can be a ected by a. It is also used in de ning undefined in rule (3d). Intuitively, cause(a; f; s) means that if action a is executed in situation s then f will be true as a direct e ect of the action a. It is used in the rule (3c) below. The E ect Axiom (3c) and axioms (3d) and (3e) are de ned as follows:
(3c) h(F; result(A; S)) cause(A; F; S); not undefined(A; S) (3d) undefined(A; S) may imm cause(A; F; S); may imm cause(A; F; S) (3e) undefined(A; res(B; S)) undefined(B; S)
The e ect axiom allows us to prove that f will hold after a, if the preconditions are satis ed. Axiom (3c) di ers from the one suggested in GL92] only by allowing terms for compound actions and by using the predicate \unde ned". The next axioms are new. They describe how the e ects of individual actions are related to the e ects of these actions performed concurrently.
4. Inheritance axioms: Intuitively, cancels(x; y; f; s) means that an action z, x z y, causes f thus cancelling the inheritance of the e ect f by the action y from its sub-action x . Intuitively, noninh(f; x; s) means that the action x does not inherit the e ect f from its sub-actions in situation s.
The non-inheritance axioms in (4) are essential for the correct treatment of concurrent actions. According to these axioms the e ects of compound actions are normally inherited from the e ects of their components. (5) Theorem 3.1. Soundness and completeness of Let D be an arbitrary domain description and P = f after a 1 ; : : :; a n be any v-proposition in the language of D such that a 1 ; : : :; a n is executable in any model of D. Then D j = h(f; a 1 ; : : :; a n ]) i D j = P. 5 2 The result shows that general-purpose nonmonotonic system of disjunctive logic programs has su cient power for modeling reasoning about domain descriptions of A C . Unfortunately, at the moment there is no well-understood query answering mechanism that can answer queries for arbitrary disjunctive databases. For some results in this direction see for instance Wat94, BEP94] . In the next subsection we consider two other translations of a domain description into subclasses of logic programs for which inference mechanisms are much better understood. These translations are however weaker than and therefore are incomplete in general. instead of (2) . Rules of the form 2 are referred to as constraints. But at the same time it makes it much more e cient. This is due to the fact that f D has neither of the computational di culties present in 0 D. Disjunctions are obviously eliminated, but moreover, the resulting program is easily reducible to a so called acyclic program 6 for which the standard computational mechanism of \classical" logic programming, called SLDNF resolution is sound and complete AB91]. Also, most of the proposed semantics for negation as failure coincide for acyclic programs, and hence no special di culties related to stable model semantics are present. The resulting program was run on a simple extension of Prolog which allows for treatment of :. It was also used for constructing and proving the correctness of simple planners capable of producing plans with concurrent actions. In Observation 3.1 and 3.3 we observed that in D and 0 D we can replace may imm cause by cause in the body of the rules (1a), (1b), (3d) and (4d) without a ecting its answer sets. Such is not the case for f D. The following example explains the need of having causes instead of may imm cause in the body of the rule (4c) in the program f D. 
The rules X1 and X2 are obtained in
Step (2' Z3 noninh(:opened; X; S) subseteq(fopeng; X); may imm cause(fopeng; opened; S); not cancels(fopeng; X; opened; S) Z4 noninh(opened; X; S) subset(fcloseg; X); may imm cause(fcloseg; :opened; S); not cancels(fcloseg; X; :opened; S)
By instantiating Z4 with X = fopen; closeg we obtain the clause: noninh(opened; fopen; closeg; S)
Similarly, from Z3 we obtain the clause 
CONCLUSION
This paper merges ideas from several areas of research and depends substantially on many results in all of these areas. This makes a complete description of related work a di cult if not an impossible task. We would not even attempt to accomplish this task here. Instead, we mention only the work which had direct and immediate in uence on us. We hope it will help the reader to better understand the proper place this paper occupies in a large puzzle we, together with many other people, are trying to solve.
Introduction of the language A C and its semantics is part of an attempt to develop a framework for systematic development of theories of actions and their e ects.
There is a large body of work on formalization of reasoning about actions which di er substantially in ontology of actions, in logics (monotonic and nonmonotonic) used for the formalizations, and in the degree of precision and generality attempted by the authors. A typical paper on the subject described a modi cation of the old (or, possibly an entirely new) approach and illustrates its utility by representing several \canonical" examples, such as the blocks world or the \Yale Shooting" story and its enhancements. Competing approaches were evaluated and compared mostly by their ability to represent knowledge from these examples and by the elegance of the corresponding representations. This methodology proved to be very fruitful. It sharpened our understanding of common-sense reasoning about actions and led to substantial advances in theories of nonmonotonic logics and logic programming. At the same time it left researchers with a great diversity of methods of representation without providing them with a framework for outlining ranges of applicability of these methods and their advantages and disadvantages. The diversity re ects the di culty and richness of the problem and is probably unavoidable, but we hope that the development of such a unifying framework will help to structure the multitude of di erent formalisms and to make this diversity manageable. This of course could only happen if such a framework is based on clear mathematical grounds and helps to facilitate mathematical analysis and comparison of di erent methods of representation.
There are several recent publications, including Rei91, Rei92, San94, GL92] which attempt the development of such a framework. The attempts di er in scope and methods but share a large number of basic assumptions. Our work is based on the approach originated in GL92]. That paper introduces a high-level action description language A, gives its semantics based on the notion of an automata, and outlines the approach of using entailment relations in action description languages for proving properties of various formalisms for modeling reasoning about actions. We hope that by now the connections between GL92] and the present paper are obvious. The Toronto group 7 and some others Elk92] base their unifying framework on the language of situation calculus McC59] and its extensions (see for instance GLR91], PR93] and Elk92]) as the means of expressing knowledge about actions and their e ects, and classical logic as the means of formalization of reasoning. In further work Rei93, LLL, Pin94] the simple ontology of situation calculus is enriched by introducing complex actions, actual time line, non-deterministic actions, etc. E ects of actions are described by a collection of axioms written in the syntax of rst-order logic. The inertial property of the corresponding dynamical system is described by the so called successor state axioms which determine necessary and su cient conditions for a property to hold after the execution of an action. This approach provides a solution to the Frame Problem which, though limited in scope, is elegant and applicable to a large class of dynamical systems. Sandewall San92, San94] concentrates on the development of a model of reality as a dynamical system viewed as a game between an ego and the world. The rules of the game are determined by the Ego-World Semantics. The semantics is used to describe a taxonomy of dynamical systems which is applied to the analysis of several nonmonotonic (mainly preferred models based) formalisms for representing actions. Unfortunately, the detailed description of the approach (soon to appear in the book)
is not yet available to the authors which precludes serious comments on its strengths and weaknesses. 8
All three approaches enjoyed considerable attention in the last few years. Initial frameworks were extended to include richer ontologies and several logical formalizations were evaluated and compared w.r.t. them. The relation between the frameworks is not yet well understood (see however Kartha Kar93] and Theischler Thi94]). The Toronto group's approach and the approach based on A share the same view of a dynamic world based on the situation calculus model. The di erence is in the type of language used to describe actions and in the type of logic associated with this language. The former uses general purpose classical logic while the latter prefers a special purpose, high level language with nonmonotonic, specialized semantics. The main challenge of the Toronto group's approach then is to nd proper collections of axioms describing the corresponding ontology, while for us the problem is rather to describe a class of models de ning the proper entailment relation. We pay for the simplicity of the language by the necessity to develop this new semantics. We believe that the two approaches shall not be viewed as rivals but rather as mutually complimentary ways to study the same entailment relations. Future research will show if this is a right assessment. The second theme of the paper is centered around the question of applicability of logic programming languages to representing knowledge about actions. The early attempts on such representation include Eshghi and Kowalski EK89], Evans Eva89], Apt and Bezem AB90], among others. These formalizations used the language of general logic programs and therefore assumed the closed world assumption about all predicates. Formalization in the language of extended logic programs which has no such limitation was suggested in GL92] and also in Mil95]. The formalization in GL92] extends the previous suggestion by Apt and Bezem AB90] and is shown to be sound w.r.t. semantics of A. This work was generalized to achieve complete formalization of domain descriptions in A in the languages of extended logic programs with disjunctions Tur94], abductive DDS93, Dun93] and equational logic programming HT93] respectively. In BG93] we describe a rst attempt at generalizing these programs to the dynamic systems with compound actions. In this paper we extend our approach in BG93]. We hope our work illustrates how the use of action description languages and their semantics facilitates rigorous reasoning about various formalizations, allows to gradually strengthen them, and to investigate the relations between di erent approaches. The last theme, related to the treatment of concurrency in the language of situation calculus follows the lines suggested in GLR91]. A paper addressing the possibility of expressing the results of concurrent actions in situation calculus is LS92]. The important di erence is in the choice of the formalisms { the nonmonotonic approach of LS92] uses two di erent non-monotonic logics { circumscription and default logic. In contrast our approaches use single formalisms of domain descriptions or that of logic programs. There are some other di erences: for instance, in Example 3 expanded by a v{proposition \ initially open", the formalism of Lin and Shoham uses inertia to entail holds(open; fopen; closeg]) while we believe that \unknown" (produced by our systems) is the more intuitive answer. Nevertheless, to capture Lin and Shoham's intuition we need to rede ne the denition of models by requiring that actual time line and hence does not allow hypothetical reasoning easily expressible in two other frameworks.
( ; a 1 ; : : :; a n ]) = when E + \ E ? 6 = ;.
In the translation we need to add the following rules.
holds(F; res(A; S)) holds(F; S); noninh(A; F; S); undefined(A; S)
:holds(F; res(A; S)) :holds(F; S); noninh(A; F; S); undefined(A; S)
Another approach would be to randomly choose from the intersection of E + and E ? , and have the translation such that each answer set corresponds to a particular choice.
The nice feature of Lin and Shoham's formalization is the so called epistemological completeness of their system LS91] for deterministic actions. Intuitively, a theory of a (deterministic) action is epistemologically complete if, given a complete description of the initial situation, the theory enables us to predict a complete description of the resulting situation when the action is performed. Since some of our actions are not executable we can not expect to have precisely this property but with respect to the naturally modi ed notion our formalisms are epistemologically complete. In other words, it can be easily shown that given a complete description of the initial situation, our theory enables us to predict a complete description of the resulting situation when a sequence of executable actions is performed. Another recent paper addressing the possibility of expressing the results of concurrent actions in situation calculus is ALP94]. The approach in ALP94] allows concurrent executions of di erent instances of the same action and treats`concurrency' from the program execution point of view. It formalizes the notion that if f is true after executing action a followed by action b and also true after executing action b followed by action a then f can be assume to be true after concurrently executing a and b. It seems that such a formalization will not be able to express the e ect of executing lift l and lift r concurrently as described in Example 2. But more study is necessary to further compare the approach in ALP94] with our approach.
There are of course many open questions left in all of the three directions of research outlined above. In the nearest future we plan to concentrate on two of them:
direct extension of the previous work by developing extensions of A C to allow representation of knowledge about dynamical systems with richer ontologies and building provably correct logic programs describing the corresponding entailment relations; discovering methods to use these declarative programs to automatize various forms of reasoning utilizing this knowledge.
APPENDIX: PROOFS
In this we prove the theorems stated in the earlier sections. First, let us notice that Induction: level = (n,m)
1. Let a 1 ; : : :; a n be executable in M. Then, (a) f 2 direct + (a n ; n?1 ) i there is an e-proposition (a n causes f if p) in D such that p holds in n?1 (by de nition) i H(p; s n?1 ) A (by IH) i may imm cause(a n ; f; s n?1 ) 2 A (By consistency of A, rule (3a) and (e) a 1 ; : : :; a n is executable in M ) E + (a n ; n?1 ) \ E ? (a n ; n?1 ) = ; ) direct + (a n ; n?1 ) \ direct ? (a n ; n?1 ) = ; and inherited + (a n ; n?1 ) \ inherited ? (a n ; n?1 ) = ; )
There does not exist f such that both may imm cause(a n ; f; s n?1 ) and may imm cause(a n ; f; s n?1 ) are in A, and there does not exist f such that both noninh(f; a n ; s n?1 ) and noninh(f; a n ; s n?1 ) are in A (Using 1(a) to 1(d) of Lemma 5.4.) ) undefined(a n ; s n?1 ) 6 2 A (Using Proposition 3.1 on rules (3d) and (4e) of the program. ) (f) =) Let f 2 n ) f 2 n?1 E + (a n ; n?1 ) n E ? (a n ; n?1 ) )
At least one of the following cases is true.
i. a n is atomic and f 2 n?1 n E ? (a n ; n?1 ) ii. a n is not atomic and f 2 n?1 n E + (a n ; n?1 ) n E ? (a n ; n?1 ) iii. f 2 direct + (a n ; n?1 ) iv. a n is not atomic and f 2 inherited + (a n ; n?1 ) n E ? (a n ; n?1 ) i. a n is atomic and f 2 n?1 n E ? (a n ; n?1 ) ) holds(f; s n?1 ) 2 A (by IH) and may imm cause(a n ; f; s n?1 ) 6 2 A (by 1(b)) and undefined(a n ; s n?1 ) 6 2 A (by 1(e)) ) holds(f; s n ) 2 A (by using Proposition 3.1 on rule (1a). Note that we can use rule (1a) only because a n is atomic.).
ii. a n is not atomic and f 2 n?1 n E + (a n ; n?1 ) n E ? (a n ; n?1 ) ) From f 6 2 E + (a n ; n?1 ) and f 6 2 E ? (a n ; n?1 ) we can conclude that there exists an atomic action b in a n such that there is no e ect axioms of the form b causes f if p where p holds in s n?1 ; It is easy to see that b is executable in n?1 and f 2 (b; n?1 ). By IH this implies that holds(f; res(b; s n?1 )) 2 A. From f 6 2 inherited ? (a n ; n?1 ) using 1(d) we can conclude that noninh(f; a n ; s n?1 ) 6 2 A. By 1(e) we have undefined(a n ; s n?1 ) 6 2 A. Hence using Proposition 3.1 on the rule (4a) we can conclude that holds(f; s n ) 2 A. iii. f 2 direct + (a n ; n?1 ) ) may imm cause(a n ; f; s n?1 ) 2 A (from 1(a)) ) cause(a n ; f; s n?1 ) 2 A (By IH and Proposition 3.1 applied to rules (3a) and (3b)) ) holds(f; s n ) 2 A (Using 1(e) and applying Proposition 3.1 to rule (3c)).
iv. a n is not atomic and f 2 inherited + (a n ; n?1 ) n E ? (a n ; n?1 ) ) From f 2 inherited + (a n ; n?1 ) it is easy to show that, there exists an action b a n such that a 1 ; : : :; a n?1 ; b is executable and f 2 direct + (b; n?1 ); from which we can conclude by (iii) that holds(f; res(b; s n?1 )) 2 A. From f 6 2 E ? (a n ; n?1 ) we can conclude (by 1(d)) that noninh(f; a n ; s n?1 ) 6 2 A. Hence, using Proposition 3.1, 1(e) and rule (4a) we can conclude that holds(f; s n ) 2 A. (= Let holds(f; s n ) 2 A )
By Proposition 3.1 at-least one of the following three cases must be true. (Note that undefined(a n ; s n?1 ) 6 2 A in all the three cases) i. holds(f; s n?1 ) 2 A, a n is atomic and may imm cause(a n ; f; s n?1 ) 6 2 A. (Using rule (1a))
ii. There exists an e-proposition (a n causes f if p), such that H(p; s n?1 )
A. (Using rule (3c) ).
iii. There exists an action b a n such that holds(f; res(b; s n?1 )) 2 A and noninh(f; a n ; s n?1 ) 6 2 A. (using rule (4a)). i. By IH, holds(f; s n?1 ) 2 A implies f 2 n?1 .
From may imm cause(A n ; f; s n?1 ) 6 2 A using 1(b) we can conclude that f 6 2 direct ? (a n ; s n?1 ). Since a n is atomic, inherited ? (a n ; s n?1 ) = ;. Hence, f 6 2 E ? (a n ; s n?1 ). Hence, f 2 n . ii. There exists an e-proposition (a n causes f if p), such that H(p; s n?1 )
A. By IH we have p holds in n?1 . Hence, f 2 E + (a n ; s n?1 ). Since, a 1 ; : : :; a n is executable we have that f 6 2 E ? (a n ; s n?1 ). Hence, f 2 n . iii. There exists an action b a n such that holds(f; res(b; s n?1 )) 2 A and noninh(f; a n ; s n?1 ) 6 2 A. We will rst show that f 6 2 direct ? (a n ; n?1 ). Suppose it is not the case. Then using the arguments similar to (iii) of (=)) we will have :holds(f; s n ) 2 A. This makes A inconsistent and we have a contradiction.
From, noninh(f; a n ; s n?1 ) 6 2 A we conclude (using 1(d)) f 6 2 inherited ? (a n ; n?1 ). Hence, f 6 2 E ? (a n ; n?1 ). From holds(f; res(b; s n?1 )) 2 A using IH we can conclude that f 2 n?1 or f 2 E + (b; n?1 ). If f 2 n?1 , then since we showed f 6 2 E ? (a n ; n?1 ), we have f 2 n . Now suppose f 2 E + (b; n?1 ) n n?1 . This means there exists an action b 1 a n such that f 2 direct + (b 1 ; n?1 ). Let b 2 be the maximal subaction of a n such that f 2 direct + (b 2 ; n?1 ); i.e., there does not exist an action c, b 2 c a n such that f 2 direct + (c; n?1 ).
We now claim that (*) for all actions g, b 2 g a n , if (g causes f if q) in D then q does not hold in n?1 . Suppose our claim is false. Then there exists an action g, b 2 g a n , such that f 2 direct ? (g; n?1 ). From maximality of b 2 we have f 2 inherited ? (a n ; n?1 ). By 1(d) we have noninh(f; a n ; s n?1 ) 2
A. This contradicts our original assumption that noninh(f; a n ; s n?1 ) 6 2 A. Hence our claim (*) is true. Therefore, by de nition f 2 E + (a n ; n?1 ) and hence f 2 n .
(g) Similar to the proof of 1(f). 2. a 1 ; : : :a n is not executable ) There are two cases: (case 1) a 1 ; : : :; a n?1 is executable. (case 2) a 1 ; : : :; a n?1 is not executable.
(case 1) E + (a n ; n?1 ) \ E ? (a n ; n?1 ) 6 = ; ) (case 1.1) direct + (a n ; n?1 ) \ direct ? (a n ; n?1 ) 6 = ; or (case 1.2) inherited + (a n ; n?1 ) \ inherited ? (a n ; n?1 ) 6 = ;
(The other two cases are not possible.) (case 1.1) direct + (a n ; n?1 ) \ direct ? (a n ; n?1 ) 6 = ; ) Similar to the case 1 (a) we can show that for some f, may imm cause(a n ; f; s n?1 ) 2 A and may imm cause(a n ; f; s n?1 ) 2 A ) undefined(a n ; s n ) 2 A (by rule (3d).) (case 1.2) inherited + (a n ; n?1 ) \ inherited ? (a n ; n?1 ) 6 = ; ) There exists a; a 0 a n such that f 2 direct + (a; n?1 ), f 2 direct ? (a 0 ; n?1 ), and there does not exist b and b 0 where a b a n , a 0 b 0 a n , f 2 direct ? (b; n?1 ) and f 2 direct + (b 0 ; n?1 ). Similar to the case 1 (a) we can show that may imm cause(a; f; s n?1 ) 2 A, may imm cause(a 0 ; f; s n?1 ) 2 A, cancels(a; a n ; f; s n?1 ) 6 2 A and cancels(a 0 ; a n ; f; s n?1 ) 6 2 A. By using (4d) and Proposition 3.1 we have noninh(f; a n ; s n?1 ) 2 A and noninh(f; a n ; s n?1 ) 2 A ) undefined(a n ; s n ) 2 A (by Proposition 3.1 and rules (4e).). (case 2) Using IH and rule (3e) we get undefined(a n ; s n ) 2 A. Since for any f, all rules with either holds(f; s n ) or :holds(f; s n ) in their head, have not undefined(a n ; s n?1 ) in their body, holds(f; s n ) 6 2 A and :holds(f; s n ) 6 2 A.
This ends the proof of this lemma. can be ignored without a ecting its answer sets, and hence ( D 0 ] 0 ) + will have a unique answer set, say A + . We will rst show that A + is coherent. 10 Incoherency is possible if we derive both holds(F; S) and holds 0 (F; S) from ( D 0 ] 0 ) + . holds(F; S) can be derived using (1a), (3c) and (4a) and holds 0 (F; S) can be derived using (1b), (3c) and (4b). Using induction on the level of S, it can be easily shown that (i) the bodies of (1a) and (1b) can not be true at the same time.
(ii) the bodies of (1a) and (3c) can not be true at the same time, because if the body of (3c) is true then the atom with may imm cause will become true making the body of (1a) false.
(iii) the bodies of (1a) and (4b) can not be true at the same time, because (1a) is applicable only for atomic actions, while (4b) needs the action to be non-atomic.
(iv) the bodies of (3c) and (1b) can not be true at the same time. (similar reason as in (ii)) (v) We can not have both holds(f; s) and holds(f; s) derived using (3c) because in that case undefined will block the derivation of both.
(vi) the bodies of (3c) and (4b) can not be true at the same time, because if the body of (3c) is true then the atom with noninh will become true making the body of (4b) false.
(vii) the bodies of (4a) and (1b) can not be true at the same time. 
